Free Will, Where Does It Come From?

[Whaleboy]

Drogue: Agreed, however his stance on moral relativism and postmodernism is something I cannot agree with, and seems to be in contradiction with the rest of his work, if you take it forward to a diabolical degree.

[Drogue]

Haven't read it in detail (will do tonight, if I can't see Louise ) so I just got an idea of his views. And anything taken to a diabolical degree won't be good

[Whaleboy]

What about evil?

[Drogue]

What about evil? If you take it to a diabolical degree, it would be bad, due to the nature of the word diabolical. However that wouldn't be very far, since almost any degree of evil is diabolical.

[Ogie Oglethorpe]

Originally posted by Drogue

Actually no. Steven Hawking has been quoted that he believes in determinism. Not because the future has already been decided, but because humans, when you put them in exactly the same position, will do exactly the same thing. Sure, it's chaotic, so a tiny difference in position could mean any size of difference in consequence, but in exactly the same position there would be no difference. If you knew the exact location and velocity of every particle, then you would be able to predict the movement of everything. Sure, it's impossible to know that, due to uncertainty principle, but the fact that if you were to know it, you could predict the future, means the future cannot change. Therefore, while the future is determined, in that we cannot alter it, as what we will choose in every situation will be what we choose, and we won't deviate from that, it is impossible to know the future. While it's deterministic, we can never know what it is that is determined, so in reality it has no practical use.

Also, you may want to read something on complexity theory. Bits of that suggest determinism, because as things can be chaotic on one level (such as the behavior of an individual human) they can be predictable on a higher level (such as the behaviour of humanity, as a whole). Just because quantum experiments are chaotic (which does not rule out determinism, just the ability to predict) does not mean that their effects on a larger scale are not predictable. They can be - "order for free".

Funny Isaac Asimov proposed this via his Foundation books long before Hawking, 'course he was ripping off quantum theory at the time.

That being said the ability to predict an individual humans behavior is a much more difficult proposition than that of a large statistical body.

[Whaleboy]

What about evil? If you take it to a diabolical degree, it would be bad, due to the nature of the word diabolical. However that wouldn't be very far, since almost any degree of evil is diabolical.

Nah, evil taken to a diabolical degree can't possibly be bad

That being said the ability to predict an individual humans behavior is a much more difficult proposition than that of a large statistical body.

Or many small statistical bodies

[Drogue]

Ogie: That's the point. It is very hard, if not impossible, to predict. The fact that it cannot be changed is the issue though. If the future is decided, we have no free will. Well we do, but it is already known what we will decide

[Ogie Oglethorpe]

Agreed,

Notice I said much more difficult to predict not impossible.

Although by predicting a future outcome, the outcome may indeed be altered, yet still fixed via the summation of outcomes in all alternate unvierses.

[Drogue]

Ah, but if we try to predict the outcome, then the determined future already knows we will try to predict it, so the future will already reflect that. Trying to predict it is simply another action

[BeBro]

I read an interesting article about free will a while ago. I can't claim to be an authority in that field, but here's (IIRC) what it said:

First, it claimed that philosophically it is impossible to prove that we are acting deterministically or not.

However, in neurobiology it is doubted that we have a free will (although there's still no ultimate proof for or against a free will).

The common view of free will is that an act of (free) will is the cause for an action. However, there are neurobiological experiments which suggests that this is not true, mostly known the "Libet-Experiment" from the 1980ies. It was found out there that a "readiness potential" builts up in the brain shortly before a decision to act. So, if the decision to act is made after this built-up of the "readiness potential" it cannot be an act of free will.

However, Libet's experiment cannot count as final proof, since there it can be criticised in several ways - for example the test persons were trained for make certain actions (to press test buttons) in very short time, so critics believe that pre-trained actions do not require much of a free will anyway. Also, many said that there is a difference between a very simple decision (press button yes/no, or press button left/right) made within seconds and a difficult (for example moral) decision where you have days or weeks of time.

But one cannot ignore that many scientists think his experiment (which was re-done later, sometimes modified) does indeed indicate an absence of free will, and that free will is only an illusion.

OTOH, and here is something I don't understand yet, some neurobiologists, even when they argue that we do not have a free will, say at the same time this doesn't make us deterministic. They rather would say we are "autonomous" beings. I'm not sure about the concrete reasoning in this point. Maybe one could help me at this point, or recommend me a good book about it

[Ogie Oglethorpe]

Originally posted by Drogue
Ah, but if we try to predict the outcome, then the determined future already knows we will try to predict it, so the future will already reflect that. Trying to predict it is simply another action

Isn't that what I said?

[Drogue]

Yes, but I don't like having to rely on "the summation of outcomes in all alternate unvierses" when I don't think there are any

[Solly]

BeBro - I've also studies referring back to something like that "readiness potential" you describe. Readiness potential can build at other times too and not be acted upon - what this means is that free will might be better described as "free won't".

I think all in this thread are vastly under-estimating the significance of consciousness.

[Drogue]

What is this conciousness you speak of?

What possibly evidence, even an inclination or a theory, have you got that there is a seperate 'soul'? A non-coporeal part of us that makes us concious? Where do your arguments come from?

I'm not saying conciousness isn't important, I'm just saying it is physical and energy states in the brain. What else could it be? What else is in your brain other than that?

[Solly]

"What is this conciousness you speak of?"

Subjectivity, awareness.

To begin with consciousness and the private universe we enjoy is indivisible. If we consider some form of reductionism, it makes sense that eventually there needs to be something that is indivisible.

The importance of the observer/consciousness in quantum experiments also leads me to believe you are underplaying its significance by describing it just a secondary phenomenon - rather than one of primary importance.

[Drogue]

I agree with all that. It isn't a secodary phenominon. It is, however, chaotic, and thus given the same circumstances, it will react the same. We can choose, it is just what we have chosen that is already decided. The fact we are subjective helps this. We are subjective, because we cannot know what the future is. But if there was an objective, it would be possible. The conciousness is important, but that doesn't mean it's not determined. It is chaotic, not random.

[Solly]

(1) The science of physics defines for us what is meant by the term physical reality.

(2) Physics is based on data from physical measurements.

(3) Anything that cannot be physically measured is treated in physics as not having physical reality. Note in this regard that the major advances of 20th century physics -relativity, quantum mechanics, particle physics, and quantum thermodynamics, have all come from recognizing this subtle limitation that exists on the nature of physical measurement and physical reality.

(4) Therefore, if it is not possible to physically measure something, then it either does not exist, or we must treat it as being nonphysical.

(5) There exists something that, under certain circumstances, we experience and call pain (quite apart from any theory of consciousness, this is our basic datum).

(6) It is impossible to carry out any physical measurement to determine the answer to the meaningful (albeit facetious) question: Does an ice cube feel pain when it melts?

[I.e., does any given physical system have an associated conscious experience when that system undergoes any specified physical process?]

(7) Therefore, since the conscious experience of feeling pain exists (quite apart from any ability on our part to account for its nature), but cannot be physically measured (although so-called correlates of it can be measured), the consciousness of things like pain must lie outside the domain of physically reality.

Consciousness is real but nonphyslcal.

http://users.erols.com/wcri/CONSCIOUSNESS.html

[Solly]

"It is chaotic, not random."

ie, non-algorithmic?

[Drogue]

Yes, non-algorithmic.

While neither can be predict, the difference is that a random variable is just that, random. A chaotic variable, given exactly the same input, gives the same output. It is just that if the input changes at all, then the output can change by any amount. You cannot take an input and work out an output in a chaotic system, thus it cannot be predicted, but given the same input, it will give the same output. The latter does not work if it is random: given the same input, the output is still random.

[Rogan Josh]

1. Free-will is inconsistent with physics.

2. No free-will is inconsistent with morality.

[Ramo]

Maybe your morality, but not mine.

[Whaleboy]

Rogan: I'll take physics over morality anyday. Morality is merely an extension of our own personal emotive disposition and is nothing constant or absolute. I'd prefer to rely upon logical principles for my ethical decisions (though of course, its not a perfect world, and I dont).

[Rogan Josh]

If a person is no more than a collection of atoms, why is killing them (ie. rearranging these atoms a little) morally wrong?

[Ramo]

Because of how my moral system is strucutured. It's based on the idea that coercion is immoral (which is simply a description of my emotions, not somehow rationally derived from the nature of the physical world), thus killing a human being is immoral.

[JimmyCracksCorn]

Free will is all about consciousness, and my definition of consciousness is based on this:

http://neurognosis.com/BS%20Theory%20(full%20version%20of%20Tuscon%20III% 20paper).rtf

Its an interesting read... very neuro-biological.

Edit: can't get link to work, just cut and paste

[DaShi]

That's alright, just reading the URL is enough.

[JimmyCracksCorn]

Originally posted by DaShi
That's alright, just reading the URL is enough.

word

[The Templar]

Originally posted by Rogan Josh
1. Free-will is inconsistent with physics.

2. No free-will is inconsistent with morality.

Let me finish the syllogism for you:

Therefore, there is no morality if physics is correct.

Hmm, elevator worked this morning. computer is working. Looks like morality is out. Damn!

[Drogue]

Originally posted by Ramo
Maybe your morality, but not mine.

Originally posted by Rogan Josh
If a person is no more than a collection of atoms, why is killing them (ie. rearranging these atoms a little) morally wrong?

Because we say it is. The same reason why anything is ever wrong. Because humans put contraints on themselves for the benefit of society.

[Rogan Josh]

Isn't that completely arbitrary?

Why is it not beneficial to society for you to be dead?

In other words, one has to make a subjective decision about what is 'good' in order to have a moral system. Notice the word 'decision' there - you can not make a decision without free-will. Therefore there is no morality without free-will.