Did the Axis have any chance at all in WWII?

[Serb]

Originally posted by David Floyd
The proper course would have been to envelop Moscow in a classic double encirclement (as in Kiev), destroy the remaining <100,000 armed troops defending Moscow, and let the city starve. Those 100,000 men were high quality troops without which a Soviet counterattack would have been difficult, to say the least, even assuming a counterattack could have been mounted with broken transportation, communication, and supply networks and in the midst of a government transfer to Kuibyshev.

100 000?
First, where did you get this number? More then 1 000 000 Soviet soldiers participated in Moscow's battle.

And second, sure today some people think that they are more talented then generals who actually commanded those battles. That under their rule results could be much better. Do you really think that you are more talented strategist then field-marshal phon Bock?
And one more thing:

Moscow was a huge communications and transportation hub. Fighting to the last man does you no good if you can't transport, supply, or talk to many of your solders.

I don't see any difference. If they took Moscow it's moved front-line a little depper into the East. In that case, I don't see how transportation lines through which reinforcments and weapons were delivered from beyond the Ural could be broken. Those lines still were under Soviet control and reinforcements still be delivered to the front-line, no matter was Moscow lost or not.

[David Floyd]

100 000?
First, where did you get this number? More then 1 000 000 Soviet soldiers participated in Moscow's battle.

At the beginning of Typhoon, there were about 800,000 trained Soviet soldiers defending Moscow. About 700,000 were eliminated in the German offensive.

And second, sure today some people think that they are more talented then generals who actually commanded those battles. That under their rule results could be much better. Do you really think that you are more talented strategist then field-marshal phon Bock?

No, I think I'm more intelligent than Hitler. The German high command and field commanders were overwhelmingly in favor of going for Moscow instead of the tactically brilliant but strategically meaningless Kiev offensive (which wiped out a third of the Soviet army in the west at the time, but wasted valuable weeks that should have been spent taking Moscow).

I don't see any difference. If they took Moscow it's moved front-line a little depper into the East. In that case, I don't see how transportation lines through which reinforcments and weapons were delivered from beyond the Ural could be broken. Those lines still were under Soviet control and reinforcements still be delivered to the front-line, no matter was Moscow lost or not

All the railroads converged on Moscow, and then ran on a roughly north-south axis (pardon the pun ). Without Moscow, most of these rails become militarily useless to the Soviets.

[David James]

Originally posted by David Floyd

That is true - the Germans needed more time, not more men. All they kept in the West were 35 low grade divisions (for the most part) that really wouldn't have been too useful.

Dammit Floyd! There you go destroying one of my longstanding pet theories about WWII.

Now I'm going to have to go find something else to harp on about...

[David Floyd]

I'll grant you Rommel coulda used a couple of those divisions, if Hitler had the balls to go after Malta first.

[Ned]

David, I know the oil embargo was a real problem for Japan. However, this was known from the summer when the embargo was imposed. But suddenly, just before Nov. 20, 1941, Tojo states that the situaltion deteriorated, forcing Japan to make concessions in its note to the U.S. (It agreed to withdraw from Indo-China, for example.) The only event that I can see that he could have been referring to are the events before Moscow. Now, what happened there on the 18th-19th was a major, major shock to the Axis. Tojo had to be referring to this.

Ned

[David Floyd]

David, I know the oil embargo was a real problem for Japan. However, this was known from the summer when the embargo was imposed. But suddenly, just before Nov. 20, 1941, Tojo states that the situaltion deteriorated, forcing Japan to make concessions in its note to the U.S. (It agreed to withdraw from Indo-China, for example.)

This was a ruse to prolong negotiations and lure the US into complacency. The Pearl Harbor attack was being advocated by Yamamoto, and accepted and planned, long before Nov. 20 - in fact, the Pearl Harbor force (6 carriers, 2 BBs, three CAs/CLs, 9 DDs, several tankers, and an advanced wave of subs) left the Kuriles on November 19th (for the subs) and November 26th (for the main body). This clearly could not have been planned and put together before Nov. 18-19, if, as you say, those days were when the Axis received a "major shock".

No, Pearl Harbor was already being planned.

[Ned]

Originally posted by David Floyd


This was a ruse to prolong negotiations and lure the US into complacency. The Pearl Harbor attack was being advocated by Yamamoto, and accepted and planned, long before Nov. 20 - in fact, the Pearl Harbor force (6 carriers, 2 BBs, three CAs/CLs, 9 DDs, several tankers, and an advanced wave of subs) left the Kuriles on November 19th (for the subs) and November 26th (for the main body). This clearly could not have been planned and put together before Nov. 18-19, if, as you say, those days were when the Axis received a "major shock".

No, Pearl Harbor was already being planned.

I urge you to read the entire Tojo document. Japan had "decided" on war in the summer - when the embargo was imposed - if they could not get the U.S. to reverse the embargo. They began moving troops from Northern Indo-China south. They began other maneuvers. They launched their fleet toward Pearl, as you said.

At the same time, they continued to negotiate. The private communiques to their ambassador in the U.S. gave him 'til the 25th to get a deal.

There are two ways to interpret these events. One is that the negotiations were a ploy. The other is that they were genuine. But, even if they were a ploy, nothing changed on Nov. 20 to "deteriorate" the situation from what it had been in the summer. The U.S. had not changed its position, nor made any concessions, nor increased its demands. The oil supply situation did not suddenly deteriorate. Nothing of substance changed from the summer - save for one thing. The disaster before Moscow.

[MORON]

Should germany even have 3 army groups....

or one in a mad dash to moscow?

[DarthVeda]

On the japs attacking Russia, it's not a likely bid by them after their thorough thrashing in 1939 at the hands of the Russians near Nomonhan. They were not so eager to have their asses handed to them twice. Besides, they were much more interested in China than the menacing cold of Siberia (which at that time, was nothing more than a timber-laden wasteland). No amount of crying from Berlin could have gotten Japan to mount more than a piecemiel attack while China was still very much an opponent.

[Alexander's Horse]

The Axis could have won the war in Europe. I can't see how Japan could have won in the Pacific.

To win in Europe, Hitler should have followed the so called "Mediterranian strategy" which was favoured by the German navy. This involved the German army defeating Britain in the Middle East instead of invading Russia whilst the air force and navy continued to attack the British Isles. This could easily have been done.

Its hard to see how Churchill could have survived if the 8th army had been destroyed - and since the 8th army comprised only a handful of divisions and the Germans had more than 200 at their disposal in 1941, I think the outcome would have been obvious.

[Ned]

DarthVeda, I think my point was the Japanese would not have attacked the U.S. at all if the Germans forced a Soviet capitulation in 1941 by taking Moscow. They then could have supplied Japan oil and other raw materials through Russia. Ned

[Ethelred]

They then could have supplied Japan oil and other raw materials through Russia. Ned

How? Its thousands of miles from Moscow to Kamachatka. The Siberian Railway is all there is the whole bloody way. Easily sabotaged. No oil pipline would have survived either and I don't think there was a pipeline in the first place.

Keep in mind that on top of the impossible logistics of what you are proposing the Alliance between the Germans and Japan was purely a matter of convenience. They didn't like, trust, or respect each other. How could they when they both thought they were members of a superior race destined to controll the world?

[LaRusso]

Originally posted by Chris 62
And now I have to agree with Floyd, the 6 weeks lost in the Balkans effectivly lost the Russian campaign.

Another sign of the apocolyspe.

not really. it was a muddy spring in russia. ever saw ukrainian roads during rain season? rivers of mud.

[Sikander]

Originally posted by MORON
Can't the US just drive carriers around and nuke the rest of the world into a radioactive rubble?

Who needs Eurowimps to win anyway?

Finally, the voice of reason.

[Sikander]

To answer the question, I give the Axis about a 1% chance of winning the war. Consider the fact that almost all of the speculation on these many pages has to do with undoing mistakes made by the Axis, or potential opportunities which were not exploited by the Axis. If the whole war was one big 'do over' (the horror) we have to assume that the Allies would have opportunities to not make some of their numerous (more than enough to fill a thread this size and then some) errors as well. The Axis made some collosal blunders, and this is generally the focus of much of the history of the conflict, because people want to know why they lost. Much less focus has been placed upon the Allies, because they won. It's very common to examine the actions of the loser looking for mistakes, and the winner looking for successful strategies and tactics.

In no particular order,

Nuclear Weapons:

These would have had almost no impact on the war unless the war continued for several more years than it did. The U.S. was in the best position to develop and deploy these weapons, and it did so with an enormously expensive program. Even so they were only brought to bear after Germany was already destroyed and Japan was fighting on with no chance to avoid it's own complete destruction. The U.S. had only two weapons, and wouldn't have been able to deploy more until 1946. Destructive as the A bombs were, they were only equivalent to one or two massive heavy bomber raids, and there were more bombers than targets by the time the A bombs appeared on the stage. The A bombs were unimportant for WWII, but obviously of critical importance soon afterward.

The Russian Campaign:

David has it almost right when he states that the Germans needed more time rather than more force. What they actually needed more than time (which IMO was working in favor of the Soviets) was supply. Dr. Strangelove is quite correct when he states that the impact of the Soviet winter caused the majority of the casualties the German armies suffered during the winter of 1941-42. Of course those casualties would have been lessened considerably had the Germans not have been forced to fight for their lives against the 1941-42 Soviet general offensive. To fight one must go outside and freeze, less they are infiltrated and butchered by their stoves like the Soviets were in the Winter War.

I again agree with Dr. Strangelove about the necessity of opening up the supply routes to Rumania via Yugoslavia. "Who cares about Rumania?", say those who remember that the Rumanian forces were at best mediocre and were crushed at Stalingrad. To which I answer, anyone who wants to use their planes and tanks. The German and Rumanian forces in the southern sector were weak in comparison to the Soviet forces. Had this sector not have been fully backed by potential reserves the Soviets may well have been able to launch an attack at the Rumanian oil fields, which Germany was dependent upon for a majority of it's petrolium. In fact even given the fact that the Germans secured this area by opening the routes through Yugoslavia, the Soviets missed a golden opportunity to harm the Germans by not massing their heavy bombers (lots of TB-3s) in the south and hammering Ploesti before the Germans managed to push the front back in the south.

Far too many people poopoo the Soviet Army's capabilities. Even though they were in the midst of a complete reorganization of their forces they managed to delay, vex, and cause considerable casualties to an enemy which had complete air superiority over the front lines, strategic and tactical surprise, experience and a vast superiority in doctrine, and a lesser superiority in training. The staggering losses of the initial German thrust kept the quality of Soviet troops fairly low for the first year (+) of the campaign as raw transcripts were trained on the job. Once the German attack was blunted the Soviets were able to close the gap in troop quality. Unfortunately for the Soviets they were never able to close the gap in doctrine or in tactical skill. Their strategic abilities were however more than a match for Germany under Hitler. IMO 9 times out of ten the SU could fight the Germans to a standstill or defeat them even without a second front. DF's assertion that the Allied landings in North Africa (Torch) stripped critical reserves from Manstein which in his opinion kept him from relieving Stalingrad are IMO fanciful. As difficult as it was for the Axis to deploy those troops to Tunisia, it would have been just as difficult to deliver and supply them deep in Southern Russia over a patched together rail network that was often only one track wide. Again here we are locking in Manstein's brilliance, Soviet failures, and in general a lot of luck for the Germans, and re-rolling the chance that the reserves would be allocated to the East, where they were a drop in the bucket.

The Yugoslav sideshow was not as critical as has been assumed. The Germans were lucky to be at the gates of Moscow in the first place, and they got there by running their troops ragged. People want to freeze that result in place as though it should be a given, and then add the 2-6 weeks lost to the Yugoslav campaign as a bonus without taking any risk that the lower level of supply and manpower in the south might have caused an equal or greater delay to the offensive.

The History Channelification of WWII:

I enjoy the History Channel sometimes I admit, though I only see it when I stay in a hotel as I am too cheap to pay for cable TV otherwise. It's like looking through the Military History section of a mall bookstore, and browsing through a few of the books there that focus only on the best known aspects of recent conflicts. Typically these books are crappy history, very long on pictures of weapons and repeating or making myths which add tension to accounts of battles and wars which in fact were foregone conclusions given an adequate understanding of the factors in play at the time. Usually these factors were not well understood by both parties to the conflict at the time, and thus there was tension aplenty for them. Not knowing all of the pertinent data, the eventual losing side was unable to predict it's own defeat and therefore made it's fateful move.

These sorts of pop histories love to dwell on factors such as weapons. Why not, they are cool as hell. But consider the fact that the Germans were outnumbered in tanks on both the Western Front in 1940 and the Russian Front in 1941, and not only did their enemies have more AFVs, they had better AFVs as well. How important was tank quality as a factor then? Not nearly as important as being able to get more tanks than the enemy into the crucial battles, which the Germans were able to do regularly in the first couple of years of WWII. Skill is another factor which is played up. The Japanese Naval Aviators were almost unbelievably skilled, and they were able to overwhelm the Allies during 1941 and most of 1942. However they were whittled down by numbers, anti-aircraft fire and time. They could not be replaced in kind because they were the best of the best, and their replacements succumbed at an ever increasing rate to the much broader base of Allied population and production.

Once these events have been chewed over by a few people the what ifs come into play. "What if the South had been able to complete their advanced steamship designs in 1861? Why we'd still have slavery today!" It's a hook that makes obscure facts that the reader / viewer may not know about seem more important than they are, and it is used to keep them watching / reading. Unfortunately this process ends up distorting the larger and far more immutable factors in the conflict. This thread is full of this sort of conjecture, and I don't really want to criticize it (I enjoy it as much as the next guy) as much as point out that there are important factors and not so important factors.

Important factors are almost all strategic. Manpower, production, geography, technology etc. They are pretty much immutable over a short period of time, though they can obviously be criminally mis-managed. The Allies possessed IMO an insurmountable lead in these important strategic factors. In petrolium for instance the allies probably controlled directly 70% of the world's proven reserves, and controlled access to much of the rest. The U.S. was by far and away the most productive nation in the war, and was in an unassailable position geographically. Both the Soviet Union and the British Empire produced more aircraft than the Germans, and the USA produced more than the British and the Soviets combined. It is hard to overcome important strategic factors such as these, especially given the degree of the advantage.

Less important factors include operational and tactical skill, doctrine and the (everybody's favorite) designs of individual weapons. The Axis made a good run at overcoming the strategic advantages of the Allies by trying to run the table with these factors, but it was a fool's errand however bravely attempted. At the end of the day they fell short of every strategic goal. They could not defeat Britain, the Soviet Union or the United States, much less all three. Borrowing from Peter to pay Paul we can speculate that perhaps given everything in their favor they may have been able to defeat or neutralize one of their opponents, but even this does not add up to overall victory, especially considering that they had to give up something in one place to get something somewhere else. The Brits and Americans had many advantages, and wisely played a very conservative hand. If the heat were turned up they may well have adjusted their priorities and upset the realigned Axis priorities themselves.

Well this was long, rambling and not very well organized, but I hope I got my points across.

[David Floyd]

I urge you to read the entire Tojo document. Japan had "decided" on war in the summer - when the embargo was imposed - if they could not get the U.S. to reverse the embargo. They began moving troops from Northern Indo-China south. They began other maneuvers. They launched their fleet toward Pearl, as you said.

At the same time, they continued to negotiate. The private communiques to their ambassador in the U.S. gave him 'til the 25th to get a deal.

There are two ways to interpret these events. One is that the negotiations were a ploy. The other is that they were genuine. But, even if they were a ploy, nothing changed on Nov. 20 to "deteriorate" the situation from what it had been in the summer. The U.S. had not changed its position, nor made any concessions, nor increased its demands. The oil supply situation did not suddenly deteriorate. Nothing of substance changed from the summer - save for one thing. The disaster before Moscow.

OK, but what you aren't seeing is that the Japanese were committed to an attack long before Operation Typhoon. Elements of their Pearl Harbor fleet were at sea even before negotiations were cut off, and a German victory in Russia would not have changed the fact that they had to have oil.

The US probably would have gone to war if Japan attacked British or Dutch possessions, and so the US fleet had to be eliminated as well as (more importantly) the US position in the Philippines.

Finally, you are assuming much more German-Japanese cooperation than actually existed. If Japan wanted to help Germany, they would have gotten aggressive in Manchuria, reinforcing the Kwangtung army fortifications, in order to pin the Far East Military District's forces in place.

Sikander,

DF's assertion that the Allied landings in North Africa (Torch) stripped critical reserves from Manstein which in his opinion kept him from relieving Stalingrad are IMO fanciful. As difficult as it was for the Axis to deploy those troops to Tunisia, it would have been just as difficult to deliver and supply them deep in Southern Russia over a patched together rail network that was often only one track wide.

I disagree. First off, some of the reserves were taken from the Russian front. Secondly, what was definitely taken from the Russian front was a significant chunk of the Luftwaffe, including over 400 transport aircraft. Manstein's 57th Panzer Corps got to within 45 miles of Stalingrad, and if it could have gotten to 20, 6th Army had plans to breakout, notwithstanding Hitler. A combination of not enough mobile forces and Zhukov's counteroffensive broke Manstein's effort, but without Torch, hundreds more aircraft and thousands of more men would have been available both to bolster Romanian 3rd Army and Manstein's relief force, and to attempt to supply 6th Army in Stalingrad.
Doesn't guarantee success, just gives the Germans a fighting chance.

David has it almost right when he states that the Germans needed more time rather than more force. What they actually needed more than time (which IMO was working in favor of the Soviets) was supply.

True, but with or without more supply, given a bit more time earlier in the year Moscow probably would have fallen. This time can come even from skipping the Balkans campaign (bad idea) or saving Kiev for later (good idea - the million troops in the Ukraine would have been in trouble without the Moscow transportation and communications hub).

[Ned]

The point about the Siberian railway is enough to force me to change my views. Even if that was insufficient to supply Japan with oil, it still does not make the peace negotiations a mere ploy.

I do think, however, that Japan's concessions made in the Nov. 20 note were linked to Moscow. Part of their war plan was to keep the USSR out of the Pacific War. With the events at Moscow, that was no longer guaranteed as a Soviet defeat was no longer inevitable.

Japan should have conceded to all American points. War with the U.S. could not have been won. What were they thinking?

In retrospect, just as Sikander pointed out, Germany did not have the resources to beat the U.K. alone. The attack on the USSR made no sense. The further declaration of War on the U.S. added to their deficit.

Germany should have have tried to negotiate peace soon after the fall of France. They could have traded France for the parts of Poland they wanted.

Ned

[David Floyd]

I do think, however, that Japan's concessions made in the Nov. 20 note were linked to Moscow. Part of their war plan was to keep the USSR out of the Pacific War. With the events at Moscow, that was no longer guaranteed as a Soviet defeat was no longer inevitable.

Hmmm. I still disagree - by the time the "concessions" were made, the Pearl Harbor attack was almost a certainty. To paraphrase a Soviet character in "Red Storm Rising", one does not assemble a large fleet in order to attack, only to call it back.

Japan should have conceded to all American points. War with the U.S. could not have been won. What were they thinking?

Conceding everything to the US was an impossibility because of the Japanese society's fanaticism about "face" - really, pride.
Their current war in China could not have been continued without oil, and that would have resulted in a loss of face. Most Japanese - especially the Army - felt Japan was invincible, so war with the US was nothing to them.

[Az]

"To paraphrase a Soviet character in "Red Storm Rising", one does not assemble a large fleet in order to attack, only to call it back. "

I hope that you don't always base your analisys on Tom Clancy , esp., the Cold War period books.

[David Floyd]

No, I was just making a point - I think that what was said is certainly vlid in that case.

[DarthVeda]

The only way Japan could have defeated the U.S. is to have, before the end of 1942, to have:

1: Sunk the entire U.S. surface fleet.
2: Occupied the Panama Canal (not entirely unfeasible)
3: Occupied the Hawaiian Islands
4: Occupied the entire South Pacific, Including Australia, and in the process capture MacArthur
5: Destroyed the ship tending, fueling, repairing, and constructing capabilities of the West coast by using carrier aircraft.

That would have put them into great position by 1943.

Now since their hold on the Panama canal would be unteniable, they would have to sabotage it in the following ways: sink numerous vessels in its straights (that would have to be raised later to allow passage), and then damage and/or destroy the locks and physical parts of the canal. Then they would have to abandon panama (again, unteniable).

By this point I'm fairly certain that the U.S. would abandon it's Germany-first policy, preventing landings in Italy and badly delaying D-Day. Another factor in taking out the Panama is that the U.S. would be unable to deploy new submarines to the West Coast fight, giving the Japanese a key advantage lost IRL in logistics.

Now here's where the strategy gets a little fuzy. Japan would have to have found some way of convincing the U.S. that the war was not worth continuing beyond this point. Here's one idea:

1: Occupation of Vancouver Island and subsiquent buildup of Air Forces in the Area would allow them to run raids on all of the West Coast. Also the occupation of the Islands of the puget sound.

By now it can be assumed that the U.S. is putting all efforts into West Coast defense.

2: Keeping the Puget safe with artillery, aircraft, and preferably, lots of mines, the Japanese could then use their air force to pulverize more of the west coast.

At this point the Japanese can sit back and force a peace settlement through attrition (ie complete and utter naval superiority in the Pacific could smash any American attempts to do anything about it). Despite the magnificent American industrial output, without a Navy to pave the way for the men and bombers, there is nothing that can be done. And the U.S. is certainly incapable of materializing a fleet out of thin air.

The question remains: how much more enduring is the American taste for blood than it's taste for a peace settlement? I can't really say. Perhaps the Americans would settle and have a cold war in the Pacific for generations. Perhaps they would sign a cease-fire so that they could attend to Germany and return to Japan at a later date.

[Az]

No, I was just making a point - I think that what was said is certainly vlid in that case.

Darth Veda: I mostly agree , with some reservations.

1: Occupation of Vancouver Island and subsiquent buildup of Air Forces in the Area would allow them to run raids on all of the West Coast. Also the occupation of the Islands of the puget sound.

totally unfeasable. how would they transport land based aircraft there ? this is just one point , that allows the US to destroy any such attempt. with more industrial output, and land based fighters (which are IIRC ,with larger range , than the carrier-based ones ) the US would quickly establish airial control over the region. (maybe the japs could attack the coastal population centers , and scare the americans, using the battleships)

anyhow , assuming SU and brits would win the European war, the SU could attack China , and subsequently Japan.

[Ned]

Darth, Good post.

David, If we knew all that about the Japanese character, then knew that placing an embargo on them would lead to open warfare.

It is a wonder we were not more prepared.

However, why did we embargo Japan in the first place knowing it would drive them to war against us?

Did Roosevelt plan all this?

Ned

[Garth Vader]

Darth, interesting post!


Germany should have have tried to negotiate peace soon after the fall of France. They could have traded France for the parts of Poland they wanted.


IIRC, they did. Churchill wouldn't agree to anything. Hitler probably didn't offer much, but Churchill made it clear he wouldn't stand for anything except Germanys surrender.

[Ned]

Originally posted by Garth Vader
Darth, interesting post!


Germany should have have tried to negotiate peace soon after the fall of France. They could have traded France for the parts of Poland they wanted.


IIRC, they did. Churchill wouldn't agree to anything. Hitler probably didn't offer much, but Churchill made it clear he wouldn't stand for anything except Germanys surrender.

Garth, I am very surprised the British position was so hard immediately after the fall of France. The mere idea that Germany would surrender at that point is simply preposterous.

Ned

[David Floyd]

David, If we knew all that about the Japanese character, then knew that placing an embargo on them would lead to open warfare.

Maybe they did know or suspect as much, or maybe at the time they weren't aware as much as we are now. *shrug*

It is a wonder we were not more prepared.

Not really - FDR most likely wanted us to be attacked.

However, why did we embargo Japan in the first place knowing it would drive them to war against us?

The US public wanted us to give help to China.

Did Roosevelt plan all this?

Who knows? It's very possible - FDR was basically a bastard.

[Ned]

Originally posted by David Floyd

Who knows? It's very possible - FDR was basically a bastard.

Really?

Ned

[David Floyd]

Yes, I think so.

[Ned]

David, I recall in another thread that you thought that FDR was wrong to engage in the acts that brought on WWII in the Pacific. Today you say you are not sure that Roosevelt actually knew that his actions would cause a war.

Two questions:

Given the uncertainty of that the embargo would cause a war, are you still against the embargo? After all, it was intended to stop Japan's aggression in China and SE Asia.

If the answer to the above is no, what, in your opinion, should the U.S. have done to oppose Japanese aggression, if anything?

Ned

[David Floyd]

David, I recall in another thread that you thought that FDR was wrong to engage in the acts that brought on WWII in the Pacific. Today you say you are not sure that Roosevelt actually knew that his actions would cause a war.

There is no firm evidence as to his INTENT, which was what I was saying.

Given the uncertainty of that the embargo would cause a war, are you still against the embargo?

Yes, absolutely opposed as it restricted the ability of US companies to do business with whom they chose.

If the answer to the above is no, what, in your opinion, should the U.S. have done to oppose Japanese aggression, if anything?

Strong diplomatic protests - as for DOING something, no, nothing should have been done (I have the same opinion, incidentally of Hitler's moves in Europe - moving into the Rhineland, for example, was nothing more than reocupying rightful German territory stripped by an immoral treaty forced by the victors).